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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The present position of the Court is not one of complete
capitulation to administrative finality, which is only as final in any
particular case as the court allows it to be in its role as final arbi-
trator, but it is simply recognition of administrative competence. "7
If the above states correctly the rationale of the Hope and the
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. holdings, then the cases portend a series
of decisions that will, with apparent disregard for consistency,
accept, reject, or compromise all the former arguments of the rate-
making cases. Whether fair value, prudent investment, present
market value, historical costs, or other methods are used to cal-
culate a rate-base, whether depreciation of certain items, good will,
going concern value, or abandoned properties are included in the
rate-base, or whether the rate-base is used at all-each will be
accepted or rejected in a particular case. This may lead to in-
consistency or confusion in the eyes of those seeking formalism
and generalities, but this process of judicial "inclusion and ex-
clusion" is the only proper way to define the relativity between
society's and the individual's interest in a problem which has such
a vast number of factorials as does public utility regulation.
It is submitted, then, that the Hope and the Natural Gas Pipe-
line Co. cases were a deliberate clearing away of the debris of
former decisions so that there could be the desirable fluidity and
flexibility in the rate-making process, and that this enlightened
approach to a practical problem will continue-at least so long as
the liberal element reigns in the Supreme Court of the United
States.
L. A. S.
THE RIGHT OF PETITION.-In the parade of decisions on the
Constitution and its principles, the right to petition' has been and
still is accorded little opportunity to participate in all the legal
pomp and ceremony accompanying the procession. Unlike freedom
of speech, it is unusual for this constitutional guarantee to be
considered separately from its cohorts. Greater contemplation is
"'? ".. . in a question of rate-making there is a strong presumption in favor
of the conclusions reached by an experienced administrative body after a full
hearing." Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564 (1917). "The limits set by the
court are deliberately broad, resulting both from notions of special competence
and the conception of rate-making as a primarily legislative process." Wash-
ington (as Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d, I1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
"'Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people
... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. AMEND. I.
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given to the other four freedoms, while this one is considered more
as an embellishment.
The fairly recent case of Beauharnais v. Illinois2 was concerned,
inter alia, with this right of petition, but only Mr. Justice Black in
dissent acknowledged its presence and granted it any consideration.
This obliqueness necessitates some comment. Perhaps in a sub
silentio manner the courts intend to define the right to petition,
but with regard to the present stampede for national security and
the consequent subrogation of individual rights, a clear enuncia-
tion of the contents of this right might prove wise, in order that it
may become a useful weapon for the individual to protest unjust
impingement of authority, custom, and opinion on his freedom.
The paucity of holdings directly founded on this right led
Mr. Justice Story to describe it with meaningless verbiage 3 and
Mr. Cooley to state, "Happily the occasions for discussing and
defending it have not been numerous in this country, and have
been largely confined to an exciting subject now disposed of."
In light of these observations, it might be appropriate to recall
Blackstone's comments on the inverse ratio existing between the
importance of rights and the legal literature accorded them. 5 One
can hardly assume that this right or any other individual right has
2 343 U.S. 250. rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 988 (1952). D was prosecuted
for violating an Illinois statute forbidding any person from publishing or cir-
culating matter which portrayed lack of virtue of a class of citizens, exposed
any race to contempt or was productive of breaches of the peace or riot. D
was president of the White Circle League, an organization to "protect" such
interests, and was instrumental in passing out handbills, apparently, from the
text of the decision, in a quiet and unaggravating manner. The printed
matter was in the form of a petition and used the following language: 'If per-
suasion and the need to prevent the white race from becoming monrelized by
the' negro will not unite us, then the aggressions . . . rapes, robberies, knives,
guns and marijuana of the negro, surely will." Consideration of the right to
petition was dispensed with on a pleading technicality. Five separate opinions
were written, four in dissent, and they embrace several interesting questions
beyond the scope of comment by this note. The majority opinion, by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, stated that the statute was not a "catchall" enactment but
rather was directed at the unprotected form of speech of "group libel" and was"specifically directed at a defined evil." Mr. Justice Black dissented on familiar
grounds; . . . "[Nbo legislature is . . . vested with power to decide what public
issues America can discuss." Mr. Justice Reed dissented because the words
of the statute were of "ambiguous meaning and uncertain connotation." Mr.
Justice Douglas denied the right of legislatures to curb the fundamental rights
within "reasonable grounds." Mr. Justice Jackson reversed himself in that he
now believes that the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not the same as
the First. He also asserted that the "clear and present danger" test should
be kept alive.
32 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 645 (5th ed. 1891).
4 1 COOLEY, TREATIsE ON THE CONsTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONs 728 (Carrington's
ed. 1927).
5 1 BL. CoMm. 125 (Lewises' ed.).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol55/iss3/9
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
been adequately defined in the present society of mutable economic
and social interests.
Petitioning has always been considered, along with other re-
lated guarantees, as a basic, fundamental, and natural right, and
the constitutional amendment incorporating it recognizes it by its
own terms as a pre-existing one. It has been articulated in the
Magna Charta, the Petition of Rights, the Bill of Rights, and in
the Federal and State Constitutions. Indeed, an impetus for our
present government was furnished by ignoring this fundamental.7
The enumeration of the right in the First Amendment "was
probably suggested by the fifth declaration of the English Bill of
Rights passed in the first years of William and Mary, after the
revolution of 1688, wherein the right of the subject of petitioning
the king is set forth."
Because the United States was to be a government of delegated
powers, strong argument was advanced against the listing of the
First Amendment guarantee in the Constitution.9 If the govern-
ment could exercise only the powers that were expressly conferred
upon it, there was apparently no need for express restrictions on
the powers; but zeal for absolute certainty caused their implacement
in the First Amendment as an indication of intent to emasculate
any attempts by the sovereign to encroach on these rights and free-
doms. Perhaps today, the prudence of this injection is becoming
apparent. As common law rights, the guarantees have never been
considered absolute, and from the time of their incorporation to
the present, this relativity has defied a definition of even moderate
precision with popular interpretations being applied many times.10
The initial determination that these guarantees applied to the
federal government alone was in harmony with the then prevalent
emphasis on state supremacy." Interpretations given the rights
stayed within this bound until a new frontier for judicial legisla-
tion was barred by the Fourteenth Amendment, a legislative com-
mand to apply the federal constitutional amendments to the states;
but fortunately, the specificity and the extent were not indicated.
Whatever the prohibition, it was firmly settled that the limitations
applied only to state actions and in no way controlled relations be-
a 16 CJ.S. 214 (1939); State v. Butterworth, 104 N.J.L. 579, 142 Ati. 57 (1928).
7 "In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in
the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by
repeated injury." Declaration of Independence.
8 BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 557 (2d ed. 1897).
0 2 VON HoLsr, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITM STATES 248 (1888).
10 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
"-Barron v. Mayor, etc. of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (US. 1853).
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tween private parties; this area was still the domain of the state. 12
By a tortuous route, judicial decisions reached the point where the
First Amendment was made applicable to the states, 13 but still this
issue has not matured to the point of finality-as Mr. Justice
Jackson's dissent in the principal case indicated. For a time, this
incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth was
attempted through the "privilege and immunities" clause,' 4 but
the majority view today is to accomplish this assimilation via the
due process proviso. Since 1931, each of the First Amendment
guarantees has, by way of the due process clause, been made
applicable to some extent to the states.' 5
The infamous "gag resolutions" of the House called attention
to the Right of Petition early in the country's history.10 Unfor-
tunately, this action was not presented to the courts in such a way
that they could rule on the propriety of this legislative action. Be-
cause of the adoption of the Maryland and Virginia laws for the
District of Columbia when it was formed, slavery continued to
exist in the District. Although the federal gvoernment had no
power to control slavery in the various states, it was vested with
such power for the District. A multitude of petitions plagued the
Congress to abolish slavery in the District and threatened to disrupt
the uneasy peace maintained by the northern and southern repre-
sentatives. Each petition, although directed to slavery in the
District, reflected on slavery existing elsewhere. To abort the dis-
ruptive influence of such petitions, the House passed resolutions on
several occasions either to table all such petitions or not to receive
them at all. John Quincy Adams tested the action by refusing to
vote because the proposed action would be unconstitutional, and
he continued unceasingly to fight such resolutions on that basis.'7
The "gag resolutions" illustrate a facet of the right of petition.
In a republican form of government, all powers stem from the
people; a fortiori, the government must be responsive to the desire
12 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
l3 Near v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 647 (1931).
'4 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1837); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78 (1908). See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
15 Religion: See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Speech and
press: Near v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 647 (1931); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940). Rights
of assembly and petition: See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Hague
v. CI.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
18 See VON Hoist, op. cit. supra note 9, at 235 et seq.; BLAcK, CONSTU-
71ONAL LAw 557 et seq.
17 VON Hotsr, op, cit. supra note 9, at 245.
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of its peoples and have avenues of communications for their desires.
This right is one of the constitutionally created avenues, and if it
exists, there must be a corresponding duty residing in the govern-
ment to receive and entertain petitions in order that the right be
efficacious. The House tried to destroy this right, at least on the
question of slavery, by eliminating its correlative duty.
Although this action was improper, it further illustrates the
point that as the right of petition is a relative one, so too is the
duty that resides in government. It is traditional that before a
petition can be considered, it must first be received. Conditions
can be attached to its reception, although prohibitive conditions
would be improper. Two ancient conditions are that the petition
must not use unbecoming or abusive language and that it must
be directed to a body with power to act upon it; otherwise, it will
not be considered. If received, there are no compelling rules as to
how it should be entertained, for having been received, it has
apparently served the function for which it was created. Objection
may be made to the petition or to the receiving of the petition
without assigning grounds.18 It seems to be sufficient if some con-
sideration is allowed, even the little that is meted it by a vote not
to consider.
The Cruickshank case 9 is perhaps the earliest United States
Supreme Court decision that is of aid to a general discussion of the
First Amendment guarantees. The "Civil Rights" statutes were
enacted with intent to supplement the recently passed Fourteenth
Amendment-the amendment that reversed the position of federal
and state citizenship, making the former supreme. An action was
brought under the statute against a group of individuals charging
that they conspired todeprive a citizen of the United States of his
rights guaranteed by the amendment. The Court pointed out that
because the federal government was one of delegated powers and
the states by the amendment had only granted the right to the
federal government to prohibit federal or state deprivation of the
guarantees, the statute would not afford a mechanism for an in-
dividual to obtain redress from another for an invasion of his
fundamental rights. The control of relations between individuals
still resided in the states as it did at common law before the en-
actment of the Constitution.
is ROBERT's RuLEs oF ORnz. RViSED 23.
10 See note 12 supra.
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The Civil Rights cases2" further considered this legislation and
declared it to be unconstitutional. With a reiteration of the matter
of the Cruickshank case, the Court added that since the Fourteenth
Amendment was only to prohibit state action, the federal govern-
ment could take no affirmative action until the state had taken
action adverse to these rights. Thus, because the legislation was
premature and directed to the control of a subject within the
domain of the state, it was void.
Mr. Justice Miller indicated in Ex parte Yarbrough2l that
within the domain of rights and duties existing between the indi-
vidual and federal government, Congress could enact positive legis-
lation to prevent interference with those rights by other individuals.
In this case, a conviction for a conspiracy to prevent one from
exercising his right to vote on federal matters was sustained.
Therefore, the rights and duties created by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments seemingly have no application to the relation
of one individual with another, act only prohibitorily on the rela-
tion between a state and an individual, and are an affirmative
force on the relationship between the federal government and the
individual.
The Right of Petition may best be defined by a negative
approach; for every right there is a limitation on that right. The
wordings expressing the limitation vary with the right but generally
have the same scope, and the scope of the limitation is determined
by prevalent legal philosophy. Today, the socialization theory of
justice waxes supreme, and the tendency is to use the butcher's
thumb on the scale of justice in weighing the interest of society.
In this field stare decisis has little power in determinig the course
of decisions. Judicial inclusion and exclusion is favored, although
it results in ragged edges on the definitions of the limitations.
Although not a binding interpretation of the Federal Consti-
tution, the decisions of the state courts referred to in this note are
useful indices of the common law view of the right, and they
adumbrate its present status.
The most common form of interference with the right of
petition are private suits based on alleged libelous matter contained
in a petition. This is, of course, for state adjudication if the
petition is not addressed to a federal body. Statements to the effect
20 109 U.S. 3 (1888).
211 10 U.S. 651 (1884).
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that the right of petition is absolutely privileged have been made,22
but the better view is that it is not.23 The Supreme Court of the
United States in White v. Nichols24 held that a petition was a
privileged communication and as such, it was presumed not to be
maliciously made. Proof of express malice, however, would make
it libelous and the court would accept proof of falsehood in the
absence of probable cause in the place of express malice. Accord-
ingly, it can be qualifiedly stated that a petition presented in good
faith is absolutely privileged, and this would seem to be based on
reason. As one case 25 stated:
"If the citizen with a just cause of complaint may not question
the conduct of officials, and the administration of public
affairs, in a respectful way by petition of the proper authority,
without being subject to an action of damages for libel unless
he is prepared with witnesses to prove the truth of statements
which are made the foundation of his complaint, a wholesome
restraint upon official corruption, extravagance, and mal-
administration would be removed, and the public would
suffer."
Descriptions of the right usually contain the statement that
the petition must be addressed to a body empowered to act, creat-
ing the inference that if not so addressed, the petition is not a
privileged communication. 2  The decisions involving this ques-
tion, however, use the point to test the good faith of the petitions,
and if a mistake has been made in good faith, the privilege is still
allowed to remain, although the body will not act upon it. To
hold otherwise would place an undesirable burden on the peti-
tioner in divining the appropriate body to petition. "The right
of petition guaranteed to the citizens by the bill of rights should
not be allowed to become a trap for the petitioner to be sprung
by any such hair trigger of technical law."' 7  Of course, if the
petition is used in a dearly improper manner, such as influencing
the decision of a court, the presumption of good faith may be
destroyed.2
Another mode of encroachment on the right in the domain
of private relations is to cause or attempt to cause the individual
2
2 Yancey v. Comonwealth, 135 Ky. 207, 122 S.W. 123, 25 L.R.A. (NS.) 455
(15o9).
23 Hancock v. Mitchell, 83 W. Va. 156, 98 S.E. 65 (1919); Vanarsdale v.
Laverty, 69 Pa. St. 103 (1871); McKee v. Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455, 181 S.W. 930,
L.RA. 1916D 391 (1916).
24 3 How. 266 (U.S. 1845).
25 Ambrosius v. O'Farrell, 119 Ill. App. 265 (1905).
2 8 Weiman v. Mabie, 45 Mich. 484, 8 N.W. 71 (1881).
27 McKee v. Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455, 181 S.W. 930 (1916).
28 In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 216 N.W. 127, 55 A.L.R. 1355 (1927).
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to waive his right in advance as a condition for a contract or other
relationship. As true of most fundamental rights, this cannot be
done. "The constitutional right to petition those invested with
powers of government, being conferred to work out the public weal
rather than to serve private ends, can neither be denied by others
nor surrendered by the citizen himself." 29 Legislation may be design-
ed to infringe on the right of petition and this action comes within
the scrutiny of the prohibitory due process clause. If a statute
places justifiable restriction or limitations on the right, it is, of
course, upheld.30 If it goes too far, however, such as requiring
the surrender of the right, it is unconstitutional.
31
There appears to be no limitation in this country on the
number of persons that may initiate or sign a petition; an indi-
vidual may petition,32 or he may circulate the petition for others
to sign,33 or a group may petition.34 A limitation was placed on
the number of signers in England in 1640 to prevent riots; if more
than twenty signed a petition, they were required to secure the
approval of three justices.3 5 Perhaps this is a foundation for a
common law limitation on the number than can create a petition,
but certainly an individual can petition; in this country, it is con-
sidered an inherent individual constitutional right.
In Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. Board of Assessors for the
Parish of Orleans,30 the statement was made that the right applied
to "every being, natural and artificial." This is to be questioned
in light of Mr. Justice Stone's decision in Hague v. C.I.O.,37 that
the fundamental rights apply only to natural persons, although
corporations are "persons" within the meaning of the due process
and equal protection clauses.3 8  Being artificial creations, corpora-
tions are thought to be unable to enjoy rights that enure to natural
29Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl. 70, V A.L.R. 1443
(1921).
30 Hoskins v. Howard, 214 Miss. 481, 59 So.2d 263 (1952); State v. Sinchuk,
96 Conn. 605, 115 Atl. 33, 20 A.L.R. 1515 (1921).
z, Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. Board of Assessors, 167 U.S. 371 (1893).
32 Dennehy v. O'Connell, 66 Conn. 175, 33 Atl. 920 (1895).
33Yancey v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 207, 122 S.W. 123, 25 L.R.A. (N.s.) 455
(1909).
-14 Weiman v. Mabie, 45 Mich. 484, 8 N.W. 71 (1881); McKee v. Hughes,
133 Tenn. 455, 181 S.W. 930 (1916); Kent v. Bongartz, 15 R.I. 72, 22 Atl. 1023
(1885).
35 13 Car. II St. I, c. 5.
38 167 U.S. 37 (1893).
3 307 U.S. 496 (1939). There was, however, no conclusiveness in the hold-
ing of the Hague case, and an interesting question exists today: With regard to
corporations, does the Federal Bill of Rights or segments of it operate with
greater force on the states through the due process clause than it does on the
Federal Government?
88 Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Samford, 164 U.S. 578 (1892).
8
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persons and are individual in nature.39 Certain natural persons
have also been denied the right in part. One case based the denial
of fundamental rights to an alien on the basis that the rights are
an attribute of citizenship.40 Because it is uniformly understood
that any person is entitled to the freedoms and privileges of the
First Amendment, this holding is dubious.
The subject matter or content of a petition is apparently limit-
less. Thomas v. Collins41 stated that the grievances for which the
right to petition was created were not solely religious or political
ones and were not confined to any field of human interests. Ameri-
can Federation of Labor v. Reilly42 held that the petition does not
have to originate from an assemblage. Cases contain the phrasing
that the petition must spring from a "public or social duty" in
order to be elevated to the privileged status. The cases doing so,
however, are usually called to decide the question of malice, and
the phrase appears to be used as the antithesis to the expression
that the petition should not gratify an unfounded personal enmity.43
The privileged nature of a petition has protected its originator
from suits based on the subject matter of the petition that would
be otherwise libelous, as often in cases where a group complained
of the personal character of an individual.4" It has protected the
individual from such suits when complaint is made of the incom-
petency or misconduct of public officials. 45  The protection still
exists even though the complaint is addressed to a body without
authority to act.46 But if malice or lack of good faith is proved,
the protection ceases, and an action can be maintained.
In more unusual applications of the right, it has been held
that the right of petition will support a submission by a state to its
voters of the proposition that a portion of the Federal Constitution
should be repealed.47 Its privilege was attached to a telegram by a
labor leader informing a government official of possible union
action against an unfavorable court decision.48 The right of a
39 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
40 State v. Sinchuk, 96 Conn. 605, 115 AtI. 33 (1921).
41323 U.S. 516 (1945).
42 113 Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145, 160 A.L.R. 873 (1944).
43 Harrsion v. Bush, 32 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 173 (1885); Yancey v. Common-
wealth, 135 Ky. 207, 122 S.W. 123 (1909); Vanarsdale v. Laverty, Hancock v.
Mitchell, both supra note 23.44 Weiman v. Mabie, 45 Mich. 484, 8 N.W. 71 (1881).
45 Yancey v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 207, 122 S.W. 123 (1909); Ambrosius
v. O'Farrell, 119 Ill. App. 265 (1905); Kent v. Bongartz, 15 R.I 72, 22 Atl 1023
(1885).
46 McKee v. Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455, 181 S.W. 930 (1916).
47 Spriggs v. Clarke, 45 Wyo. 62, 14 P.2d 667, 83 A.L.R. 1364 (1932).
4s Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 277 (1941).
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political party to have its name on an official ballot in a certain
form has been held subject to reasonable police regulation and not
guaranteed by the right.
49
Now what of the holding in the Beauharnais case, predicated
upon the novel basis that the defendant committed group libel by
his petition? Even accepting such a principle of group libel, the
former position of the Court was that a petition may contain
libelous, defamatory, and unfounded matter, and that the creator
of the petition will not be subject to legal action unless the
petition was maliciously made. The writing in question was in the
form of a petition, but neither the statute nor the holding require
that malice or ill-will be proved in order to subject the petitioner
to criminal sanctions under the statute. This is certainly not in
accord with the common law definition of the right nor with the
terms of the right itself.
The right is for the redress of grievances. Without comment-
ing on the tendency of certain persons to harbor racial or religious
prejudices, one must certainly recognize that such feelings are
common to people in this country. If a sufficient percentage of
society has a deep interest on a given issue, however unjust, that
interest might better be allowed some expression. Law is for the
benefit of society and must be in harmony with the economic,
social, and political tunes of the time, and this communication
of feeling would promote legislation in accord with the times,
whereas no sound action can be taken on a hypocritical silence.
The only avenue that exists for curtailing the right of petition
is the approach that all the rights and freedoms are not absolute
and can be limited with a view to protecting the public interest.
Customarily, such curbing must find justification in a reasonable
apprehension of danger to organized government; the limitation
upon individual liberty must have an appropriate relation to the
safety of the state.50 Here, the Court based its justification for
the statute on the history of race-rioting and said it was specifically
direced to a defined evil. The people of Illinois were troubled by
racial riots; people of all states have been troubled by labor riots
or strikes, but the Court has, by virtue of the freedom of speech
proviso, seen fit to accord picketing (usually a segment of such
troubles) immunity, so long as it is peaceful. Petitioning may be
incident to racial riots, but there is no reason why peaceful petition-
ing should not be granted the same sanctity as the immunization
49 Hoskins v. Howard, 214 Miss. 481, 59 So.2d 263 (1952).
So Herndon v. Lowry, 501 U.S. 242 (1987).
10
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allowed picketing. From the above case, it appears that the cir-
cumstances surrounding the solicitation of signers for the petition
were peaceful, and thus on this basis, little justification existed for
curtailing the right.
The Court by classifying the language of the Petition as being
"within a certain well defined and narrowly limited class of speech"
removed the protection of the freedom of speech proviso. This,
then, may indicate that the wordings removing constitutional pro-
tection are the same for both speech and petition. But because a
petition has much less force than the spoken word, would it not be
desirable to allow more color in the writing?
The Court justified its removing of the freedom of speech
protection by observing that "such utterances are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas" and have slight social value. But what
if the defendant sincerely believed his statements, disagreeable as
they may be to reason? The purpose of the right is to protect and
foster expression; to penalize a petitioner for putting forth matter
later adjudged as improper is to nullify this purpose. A fallaciously
or improvidently worded petition should not, perhaps, receive
consideration, and this nonaction would be sufficient discipline.
The further punishment of the individual for writing his convic-
tions would drain the essence from the right. To prove that he
did not believe his statements would be proof of malice satisfying
the traditional requirement. To adjudge the language bad is to
do away with the necessity of finding this intent. Such adjudica-
tion removes all distinction between freedbm of speech and the
right to petition. Although the subject matter of this petition
was the disagreeable one of prejudices, later petitions may raise
issues just as disagreeable to the majority view. Permitting after
judging to remove the right will vitiate one of the safeguards of
the Constitution that sanctifies minority expression.
Two approaches to a common law expansion of this right
might be made on the basis that: (1) The right to petition differs
from the freedom of speech in that one does not have to arm him-
self with facts in advance to the assertion of possibly libelous matter
so long as he acts in good faith. The detailing by the courts of this
aspect of the right would lead to a more vigorous use of it. With
the present revulsion against the methods of senatorial investiga-
tions, care must be taken that such privileges are not swept away
by the desire to "catch" those who abuse their privileges. (2)
Robert's Rules of Order5 prescribes the manner of dealing with
5127 (d).
11
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petitions made to bodies in formal assemblage. No such exactness
exists for other governmental units, i.e., administrative and execu-
tive agencies, which leaves a vast area for judicial legislation. With
propriety, certain mandates could be evolved compelling reception
and consideration in some definite manner of the petitions of the
people. Further, certain appeals not now considered as petitions
could be so classified, thereby giving to such papers more force-
fulness.
Under the stress of the last decade, the judiciary and the people
of this country have permitted a gradual "encroachment on in-
dividual freedom" under the excuse of the necessity of preserving
the government existence. Even if the people are prone at present
to trade slices of their constitutional guarantees for the present
comfort but false security of noninvasion of the mind with ideas
conflicting with present staid ones, the judiciary, traditionally
charged with the duty of being alert and thinking, should expand
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